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Abstract
The eighteenth-century introduction of the scientiﬁc method of the natural sciences
to the study of social phenomena draws a line between moral philosophy – that as-
pect of ancient and medieval philosophy that dealt with social issues – and the social
sciences as known today. From the onset, the emerging social science, or rather, its
epistemological orientation to ‘social scientism,’ was vigorously challenged by many
critics who saw it as a reductionist and mechanistic understanding of human beings
and their society. In recent times, this criticism has narrowed down to the critique
of the rationalist assumptions or rational choice theory on which much of social sci-
entism is built. Critics of the natural science ideal in the social sciences argue that
the subject matter of the social sciences – human beings, their society and interac-
tions – is so complex and diﬀerent a system that subjecting it to the crucible of the
scientiﬁc method of the natural, positivist sciences not only limits its understanding
but leaves it with an abrasive and distorting impact. In the same manner, critiques
of rational choice theory argue that it is a reductionism that does not account for a
signiﬁcant proportion of human actions and motives. What seems to be advocated
for is a sort of social science method that addresses the shortcomings of the scientiﬁc
method applied to social phenomena and employs a more robust model of human
action that supersedes the rational choice model. This paper however posits that
rationalist assumptions or rational choice theory is not peculiar to social scientism
but lies at the foundation of modern and contemporary science and its method. We
trace out the centrality of individual rationality assumptions in the general epis-
temology of the scientiﬁc method and social scienticism within the context of the
centuries-old debate on the limitations of the scientiﬁc method in the social sciences.
Our thesis hints at the impossibility of a modern and contemporary scientiﬁc model
of either nature (physics) or society that does not assume individualist or subjective
rationality.
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1 Rationality in Science
It is often said that the distinctive feature of the Enlightenment, which rev-
olutionized science and accumulation of technological capabilities, lies in its
exaltation of human reason, that is, rationality. The emphasis on reason, ac-
cording to this thinking, distinguished the resulting modern science from what
had preceded in the ancient and medieval era. While this is true, it is only part
of the story. A philosophical excursus into the nature and process of science
understood to mean either knowledge (from the Latin scire - to know), or
organized body of knowledge, shows that science presupposes inter-subjective
rationality. Although knowledge is possible by tenacity, faith, authority, and
intuition, what distinguishes scientiﬁc knowledge in the strict sense is its re-
liance on inter-subjective rationality. The history of the theory of knowledge
from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas and through Kant to the logical positivists,
presents the process of knowledge as a cognitive process of an active, rational
subject. Therefore, not only modern science, premodern, ancient and medieval
science also proceeded on the basis of reason. The major distinguishing ele-
ment lies not just on the rationality emphasis, but rather on their orientation:
While modern and contemporary science proceeds from the basis of the indi-
vidual, subjective rationality as the ultimate basis of certainty;1 ancient and
medieval science was oriented towards the divine within a system that sub-
ordinated and hence, limited, human rationality and actions to that of an
ultimate being.
The Copernican revolution which Kant carried out in philosophy was instru-
mental in ushering in a new epistemological model that emphasized the agency
of the human subjective intellect in the acquisition of knowledge. For Kant,
the subjective intellect in knowledge is active vis-´ a-vis the object. This theory
of knowledge overturned the traditional model that holds the conformity of
the human mind to reality in a manner in which the subject is but a passive
receptor of the object as given in experience. In Kant’s Copernican Revolu-
tion, understanding became a process by which the mind exercises it faculties
over the object, by subjecting it to ´ apriori conditions in order to render it
intelligible. This means that ‘we can know ´ apriori of things only what we our-
selves put into them.’ Knowledge is no longer to be conceived as a reception of
reality as it is given, since for Kant, things as they are in themselves, are un-
knowable. Intelligibility is thus a function of the ´ apriori faculties of the subject
that empower him to receive the object.
Kantian epistemology admits the presence of both the rational faculties of the
2subjective intellect, as well as the objectivity of the object of sense experience.
This admission oﬀered to resolve the long-drawn rationalist and empiricist
debate. However, it does retain the Cartesian dualism of mind or subject
on the one hand, and body or object on the other. The process by which
the subject “captures” the object as in the context of “experience” is now
construed as an activity, an exercise of force which wrests the object from
its “given” position, imposes on it subjective, a‘priori conditions in order to
know it (Kant, 1995). This, in a way, is an extension of the Cartesian method
deﬁned as “rules for the direction of the mind.” The subject is intentionally
directed to the object and does not just seek to know it, but more importantly,
to put it to good use. This epistemology, in its individualistic and utilitarian
orientation, has become one of the deﬁning characteristics of modern scientiﬁc
method. But in this formulation, the modern and traditional epistemology of
knowledge seem to have parted ways.
Traditional Aristotelian thought, expressed in the medieval period by the
scholastic thinkers, had a diﬀerent conception of the process of experience
which was articulated in the various conceptions of the role of the agent in-
tellect, the need for species in perception and in thought, the reliability of the
cognitive apparatus of induction, the nature and function of memory, and so
on (King, 2004). Aristotle takes experience to be generated from (repeated)
sense-impressions, or, more precisely, he takes it to be the product of cogni-
tive processing, by memory and perhaps imagination as well, of (repeated)
sense-impressions.
Thomas Aquinas, proposes that the comparison or collation of impressions is a
function of what he calls “particular reason” (particularis ratio), that is, reason
applied to particulars (or the sense-impressions thereof), and thereby is proper
to humans (Aquinas, 1950, In Metaph. 1.1.15). Aquinas argues that, since the
forms of material objects (given in the sensible species or the phantasm) are
only potentially and not actually intelligible, there must be an active principle
which makes them actually intelligible, and this reduction from potency to
act requires an agent cause, which Aquinas identiﬁes as the agent intellect.
The agent intellect has two distinct and logically sequential functions: (a)
preparing the sensible species so that it is actually intelligible; (b) ‘impressing’
this prepared sensible species, called the ‘intelligible species,’ on the possible
intellect (Summa theologiae Iaq. 79 art. 3).
Sense, thus, has as its medium the sensible species, which is particular, and
the intellect has as its medium the intelligible species, which is universal. Me-
diation between the two takes place through abstraction, that is, by removing
the individualizing conditions from the particular sensible species. These in-
dividuating conditions do not alter the formal content of the nature of the
object they individuate but merely render it singular, distinct from others of
the same kind; formal diﬀerences only occur at the speciﬁc and generic lev-
3els. Hence the process of abstraction does not formally alter the nature, but
simply removes or cancels its surrounding individuating conditions. Yet be-
cause the individuating conditions do not alter the content of the form in the
individual, the form in itself must have the abstracted features, that is, the
characteristics revealed through abstraction, though in combination with the
appropriate principle of individuation the form is individualized in the object:
the form in itself is universal. The end result is that “reason”(in the person
of the agent intellect) automatically removes individuating conditions from
the sensible species, allowing the human mind to have experience of a world
that is divided into distinct natural kinds, and all of this takes place prior to
conscious experience.
Whether this is an accurate account of human psychology of knowledge is
beyond the scope of this paper, but suﬃce it to say that these outlines of the
traditional and scholastic epistemology has a lot in common with the modern
Kantian epistemology in their abstractivist and transcendental tendency that
turns on the rationality of the agent intellect. Thus, rationality is a founda-
tional premise of both the traditional and the modern theories of scientiﬁc
knowledge and not a peculiar distinctiveness of the later as is commonly as-
sumed. The major diﬀerence lies in the fact that modern and contemporary
scientiﬁc epistemology is oriented towards the individual, and turns on posi-
tivism. This is captured in the rational choice theoretical construct. Rational
choice is therefore, neither a unique distinction of modern and contemporary
scienticism, nor is it a preserve of modern and contemporary social scientism,
as typiﬁed by economics, political science and sociology. It is rather an essen-
tial moment of modern scienticism, referring to the method and epistemology
of modern and contemporary science. This is trashed out in the next section.
2 The Rational Choice Theory
In its most basic formulation, rational choice emphasizes methodical indi-
vidualism or thorough-going self-interest, intentionality, consequentialism and
optimization. In essence, the theory turns on the theory of human agency with
roots into ancient Greek thinkers. Protagoras’s man measure principle is per-
haps the earliest expression of subjective individualism. But for ancient and
medieval thinkers, the divine - not man - constituted the focus of attention and
the goal and basis of all understanding 2. Cartesian rationalism, the Coper-
nican Revolution of Kant and the general world view of the Enlightenment
once again, re-established the focus on the individual person as the originator
of intentional action and a free-choice, responsible agent. As we argued pre-
viously, in Kantian epistemology the subject is an active taker, rather than
a passive recipient, of objects of knowledge as had been taught by scholasti-
cism. Whereas Descartes had isolated the subjectivity of the subject in the
4“cogitating I”, thus laying the foundation for the “methodic doubts” that lead
to “clear and distinct ideas”, Kantian transcendental philosophy built on that
foundation to delineate the fundamental, ´ apriori conditions that enables the
subject to know the object.
While Cartesian and Kantian philosophies provided the foundation for ratio-
nalism, Bacon’s ideas in empiricism championed an opposite world view that
argued the supremacy of the factual and evidential reality. Both rationalism
and empiricism were the two schools of thought that shaped the Age of Reason,
and had wider ramiﬁcations for other ﬁelds of knowledge, including the natural
sciences. Belief in the power of human reason alone to reach valid judgments
about objective reality which both rationalism and empiricism advocated led
to the birth of the scientiﬁc method. The role of rationality in grounding intel-
ligibility and therefore, knowledge, was further ampliﬁed in Hegel’s absolute
philosophy in which he identiﬁed reality and reason. For Hegel, “the real is the
rational” and the “rational is the real” and both are absolute (Hegel, 1977).
Application of the scientiﬁc method by researchers became an epochal trans-
formation, that catalyzed the rapidity of progress in the evolution of scientiﬁc
theories, new discoveries and technological inventions which came at the af-
termath of the Enlightenment. Such unprecedented increase in knowledge oc-
casioned by the scientiﬁc method further enhanced its validity and established
it as a universal epistemology, governing the process and practice of science in
such a way as to suggest that knowledge that does not pass through its rigor
is, ipso facto, nulliﬁed.
What distinguishes rational choice from the epistemic rationality sketched
above is its purposefulness; it is teleological. It is not simply, reason exercised
for its own sake and in accordance with the human inclination to know. It is
rather purposive, rational action exercised for the sake of self-serving ends in
which the agent intellect is freely choosing between alternative ends. In this,
it is not diﬃcult to see the inﬂuence of the Enlightenment’s doctrine of liberal
individualism. It is not merely, as is often suggested, to bring reason to bear on
reality such as subjecting morality and politics to a rational enquiry. Rational
choice is a liberation of man’s reason which seems to have been held hostage
by religious dogmas and superstitions. It is part of the libertarian current
of thoughts that engulfed the Enlightenment society, politics and history. It
places the subjective, individual, agent intellect at the center of reality such
that things are only relevant in respect to his needs and desires. The rational
choice agent is the realization of the cartesian thinking subject with the over-
riding ambition “to render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.”
Seen in this perspective, rational choice also underpins modern and contem-
porary positivist science no less than the social sciences as we articulate below
in sketching the various moments of the scientiﬁc method.
52.1 Moments of the Scientiﬁc Method
The scientiﬁc method is a manner of operation of the rational, ends-oriented
subject. Its unparalleled success in its application in modern and contempo-
rary science and technology in engineering a near complete mastery of the
earth establishes it as the sole criterion for validity in knowledge. Fundamen-
tal to this scientiﬁc epistemology is the cartesian thinking,“rational”, subject
that stands distinct from external,“social”, objects (Schrieber, 2002). The
cogitative power of the cartesian subject is a foundational axiom of univer-
sal validity, and constitutes the necessary precondition for universally, valid
truths. Thus, the method of science is an epistemology whose objective is to
render the world intelligible. For this reason, modern science has been charac-
terized as the “theory of the real” (Heidegger, 1977c). Its foundational axiom
is the thinking “I” (the “Cogito”) which, for Descartes, is the ﬁrst and only
thing that is certain for sure, and lays the road map for accessing truth. This
thinking subject is both the criterion and the arbiter of truth - the source
and collector of what is as such and thus, the existential foundation for the
scientiﬁc method.
The scientiﬁc epistemology imposes on the object, dissects it in order to con-
ﬁrm prior assumptions or ﬁnd causal relationships in order to build theory,
captures it and exercises power over it. The distinctive moments of this process
include objectiﬁcation, mathematization or idealization, research, power and
authority, controllability and predictability.
2.1.1 Objectiﬁcation
Objectiﬁcation involves representation, classiﬁcation, quantiﬁcation and mea-
surement of objects of science. Representation is the manner in which the
external object is apprehended by a knowing subject (Heidegger, 1977a). The
knower knows that which is present. That which is not “present” and cannot
be “represented” in the manner of knowledge readily accessible to the subject,
is not accountable. This implies that to be known scientiﬁcally, reality must
be “objectiﬁable”. Objectiﬁcation is the process by which the real is rendered
countable, measurable and determinable. This seeks to materialize the object
in order to render it intelligible to the material senses. It captures the real
as a material substrate and imposes on it, subjective ` a priori conditions of
intelligibility.3 The consequence of this in the age of the scientiﬁc epistemol-
ogy is that all ﬁelds of knowledge strive to represent reality as object and as
data amenable to measurement and calculation.
62.1.2 Mathematization and Idealization
Idealization of reality through mathematics is another distinctive moment of
modern science. Beginning with Descartes, method, as in “rules for the di-
rection of the mind,” came to be seen as the distinguishing characteristic
of true science such that scientiﬁc method became in cartesian formulation,
the “method of the real”. As a method aiming towards precision and exac-
titude, its major distinctions are measurement and calculation. To measure
precisely and calculate exactly means that the method of science is necessar-
ily axiomatic and therefore, mathematical. But mathematics, designating the
system of logical relations between entities that are simple abstractions from
concrete, material objects, derives its basis on matter that is subject to space
and time, and is quantiﬁable. Let there be 2 dogs and 2 cats adding up to
4 animals in a zoo such that 2 + 2 = 4 becomes a mathematical formulation
of the sum of animals in the zoo. The dogs and the cats are real, individual,
material things. But their intellectual representation in the mind as 2 (dogs)
and 2 (cats) making up 4 (animals) are abstractions which are thinkable in
themselves but derive their meaning only in reference to concrete things (cats
and dogs). This implies that mathematics is naturally drawn to quantiﬁable
and measurable matter. Reality that are not easily quantiﬁed are thus, math-
ematically censored. Modern sciences deal essentially with particular matter
experienced directly through the medium of the external senses. The abstrac-
tion from the particular matter constitutes the realm of mathematics. Hence,
it is not arbitrary that modern sciences tends toward mathematization: The
particular objects which they deal with can exhaustively be dealt with theo-
retically in the abstract realm of mathematics. Questions of metaphysics – as
that which comes after physics – are of a diﬀerent order of abstraction which
are not related to objects of sense experience. Questions of ethics, justice, love,
freedom, values, norms, beliefs etc. cannot be dealt with mathematically and
hence, social scientism fare badly in these regard.
Another aspect of cartesian inﬂuence on modern and contemporary mathemat-
ical science is through his dualism of mind and body – res cogitans and res
extensa(Heidegger, 1977b). Within the cartesian ontology, there is a dyadic,
two-node relationship between the thinking subject and the object conceived
in essentially, inanimate or “arrational” terms, as nature or extended matter,
existing parts outside of parts. Observation as a process from which experi-
ence is cultivated is construed in terms that place the observer and what is
observed in opposition and at a distance from each other. 4 The cartesian inﬂu-
ence makes it be that in science, the subject assumes the status of a conscious
observer (thinking subject) of a putatively, assumed “unconscious” phenom-
ena (extended matter) under a controlled environment or its approximation.
In this observation of reality, the object of observation, i.e. the extended mat-
ter, is as a matter of necessity, captured in the two dimensions of space and
time, as a snapshot, and as an isolatable event. 5 Both time and space are re-
7ducible to numbers or discrete quantities. Mathematics naturally lends itself
for dealing with these numbers.
Extended matter, existing parts outside of parts, is to be known through calcu-
lation and measurement which yield numbers. Numbers, as proxies abstracted
from the actual objects, can themselves, be investigated and analyzed mathe-
matically to yield knowledge that is precise, exact and veriﬁable. Mathematics
has therefore, become synonymous with modern sciences, to the extent that
judgments of scientiﬁc rigor and merit is construed in terms of the perceived
quality of a study’s measurement, modeling, and overall mathematical and
statistical initiatives (Heath and Chatterjee, 2004; Sumner and Tribe, 2004).
It is this readiness with which matter easily gives-in for mathematical analysis
that renders to science its ultimate power over reality and realizes the ambition
“to render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.” Unarguably, this
has produced tremendous results in the natural and positivist sciences. In the
social sciences, however, it does not enjoy comparable success for reasons that
will be considered in later section of this paper. It frequently happens that
researchers in the social sciences, in faithfulness to the dictates of mathemati-
zation, measure, model, and apply things that are invalid and/or non-existent
(Heath and Chatterjee, 2004).
2.1.3 Research
Observation of objects takes place within the space - time continuum and
captures the data of the object as an event in a snapshot that is isolatable
from a system chain of events among interacting objects. Because the event
snapshots are independent, they can be isolated as simple events which are
replicable. The simple, repetitive events of the natural and positivist sciences
make research possible (Beck, 1949).
Through the activity of research science postulates theory which lays down
rules regarding the manner of obtaining knowledge of reality and sets a’priori
possibilities for the posing of research questions. Theory determines in ad-
vance what sort of question is posed for the real. Research proceeds by way of
observation of reality in order to organize the facts so gathered in a schema
that is pre-speciﬁed by the theory. Conclusions are drawn from observations of
interacting objects. Consistent results within a laboratory framework are used
to provide evidence about the way things work. Thus, science is made possi-
ble by the prior hypothesis that inferences can be drawn from observation of
particular objects to reveal universal characteristics about the world (Heideg-
ger, 1977c). The search for empirical regularities in the interaction of objects
and interactivity of agents is therefore one of the major deﬁning attributes of
scientiﬁc research.
8In the pursuit of science, the subject stands aloof from the object in a manner
of disinterested observation. The subject stands over and against the object,
conceived as the “other”. His role is nothing more than that of a chronometrist
who arranges tiny pieces of objects into the dynamic order of the clock piece.
Hence, disengagement and cognitive separation are the hallmark of the scien-
tiﬁc method(Shapin, 1995). In dealing with the object of science, the subject
is to apply only rules and procedures validated within the speciﬁc domain of
practice, say physics. These rules and procedures are themselves scientiﬁc in
so far as they are independently veriﬁable and universally valid. Whether the
object of investigation is a stone, lying out there, or a cognitive process such as
the process of feeling, the subject-object cognitive and existential separation
is necessary.
While this process delivers consistent, veriﬁable and manageable results it
however, limits the scope of what could be investigated. Reality that is not re-
ducible to quantiﬁable and calculable stuﬀ is ignored and treated as irrelevant
thus rendering to measurability the criterion for relevance. This diﬀerence be-
tween measurable and non-measurable things draws the line between what is
regarded as truly “science” and “non-science” in the modern and contempo-
rary epoch. Fields of knowledge where the object is not easily quantiﬁable, in
a manner that renders it calculable, are dubbed “unscientiﬁc” and incapable
of providing exact, valid and veriﬁable knowledge. To escape the derogation of
“non-scientiﬁc” various disciplines strive to tune up to the manner of operation
of science so conceived.
2.1.4 Power and Authority
Francis Bacon, one of the ushering-in voices of modern scientiﬁc epistemology
conceded from the beginning that science is a road to power. The ’knowledge
is power’ dictum of Francis Bacon is predicated on the desire to explore and
exploit ’Nature’s secrets’(David, 2004). This understanding of knowledge as
power and of science as a route to power, was alien to the pre-modern thinker
who rather conceived of knowledge as logos (the science of being), in which
there was no distinction between the man of arts and man of measurements,
as logos manifested itself both in the poems of Goethe and the experiments
of Galileo. The Cartesian man, however, appropriated this aphorism of power
and exalted the mathematised science as the ﬂowering of rationalism. Inherent
in this desire to explore and exploit, is also the power of modern science to or-
der, miniaturise and modularize nature into controllable portions examinable
through the refractive lens of repeatable experimentations, with the expecta-
tion that these experiments would lead to new insights and add to existing
knowledgebase. Because knowledge is restless (Metcalfe, 2003), it continues to
stimulate the disequilibria on which modern science thrives. These incessant
disequilibria lead to episodic uncertainties characteristic of the spatio-temporal
9discovery process of modern science. In order to mitigate these uncertainties
the modern scientiﬁc paradigm aims towards specialisation.
It is assumed that specialisation would enhance the value of modern science,
especially by adding to the certainty of its predictions, thereby providing some
sort of stability in its ordering of nature. Specialisation, while supposedly pro-
viding an opportunity for in-depth understanding of the particularity of the
controlled and miniaturised nature, at the same time creates barriers between
diﬀerent epistemological domains, and consequently orchestrates the profes-
sionalisation of knowledge. Since no one person can fully claim knowledge of
any miniaturised epistemological domains (because these domains have been
further modularized by areas of specialization), the knowledge of a practice
domain then resides in the collectivity of its professional practice (Brown and
Duguid, 1991). Knowledge and expertise are, therefore, extended and shared
by members of the same profession. From these collective professional do-
mains and their antecedent paradigms, accounts of nature are given. Thus the
professionalization of knowledge (i.e. community of practice), in turn lends
legitimacy to the variety of accounts given by the diﬀerent epistemological
paradigms and professions.
Modern science in its modularised parts requires authority to be coordinated
(Brusoni, 2003). Authority comes from capabilities conﬁrmed by the exacti-
tude of predictions to mitigate uncertainties, and is manifested through the
discipline of the disciplines to discipline their members. Therefore, the history
of modern science has been an account of rivalries of authorities (Ross, 1991).
For instance, following the independence of economics, as a discipline, from
sociology in the 19th century, the economic paradigm fashioned against the
discipline of mathematised sciences became a dominant paradigm of evaluat-
ing social behaviours. Firm’s behaviours were interpreted from such perspec-
tives as structure and strategy, competition and market structure, bargaining
power, transaction costs and contracts. Towards the middle of the last century,
the socio-political paradigm re-emerged as a competing paradigm for under-
standing ﬁrm behaviours. Drawing from its portfolio of theories, it relied on
such accounts of ﬁrms as entities embedded in national institutions, which gave
rise to national innovation and business systems. The socio-political paradigm
also interpreted ﬁrms as bundle of networks, power relations, professions and
practices.
2.1.5 Action and Control
Inasmuch as modern and contemporary scienticism is about power over nature,
it is is also about action and control. In line with the foundational questions of
Kant’s transcendental idealism, modern science is not just satisﬁed, and does
not end, with questions of what we know and how we know what we know.
10Most fundamentally, it is preoccupied with what to do6. Action is therefore,
a necessary corollary of the power of scienticism. According to Heidegger, the
technological man, is a superman, a man of ranks “...who breaks forth into
the unsaid, ... compels the unhappened to happen ... and makes the unseen,
appear....”
The practical orientation of modern science has implications not only for the
sciences but also for the social sciences as well. Within the sciences, the nat-
ural sciences of physics, chemistry and biology are beginning to lose out to
their new and applied oﬀsprings due to the latter’s emphasis on practical-
ity and utility. In the social sciences as well, research that is not tailored to
“policy implications” may not be well received. This in turn has led to the
widespread application of engineering concepts to ﬁelds lying far away from
material objects as organization (organizational engineering), society (social
engineering), politics (political engineering) and so on. Having understood the
society through the lens of the scientiﬁc method, the next is to “engineer” it.
At the extreme, this “engineerization” of the society has produced results such
as Communism and totalitarianism.
3 Social Sciences and Rational Choice
The 20th century has witnessed something of a revolution within the social
sciences especially, in economics, political science and sociology, whereby all
manner of behaviour is assumed to be instrumentally rationalizable. It is pos-
sible to argue that the rational, methodical individualistic homo economicus
is the neoclassical social science realization of the Cartesian subject. The ra-
tional, self-interested agent is projected as consistently acting for the sake of
some pay-oﬀ or reward, and is always aiming towards optimizing this pay-oﬀ
(Ensminger, 1996). In game theory, this rational subject is projected as a cal-
culating strategist, whose actions always spring from what he thinks others
think that he is thinking that they are thinking.
The social science axioms of rational choice 7 seem to be a linear transfor-
mation of similar axioms of logic 8 and mathematics9 which are reducible to
metaphysical principles of identity and diﬀerence10. Ouspensky (1922) notes
that these axioms are, in fact, abstractions from the phenomenal world which
apply primarily to ﬁnite and constant magnitudes, and concepts, respectively,
and which are invalidated when it comes to matters relating to emotions,
subjective feelings and beliefs as has been elaborated by Boudon (2003).
As has been discussed above, the scientiﬁc method makes varying assump-
tions regarding the conditions of both the subject and the object of research.
In importing this methodology into the social sciences, these assumptions had
11to be modiﬁed to suit the nature of social reality in contrast to the objects
of the natural and physical sciences. Rational choice theory achieves this end.
When considered critically, this approach to human behaviour appears to be
a necessary corollary to the radical mathematization of the social sciences
that is also one of the major hallmarks of 20th century scholarship. For the
laws of mathematics and logic to apply to social phenomena, it is crucial
that the assumptions of rationality (rational choice theory) be binding on the
agent. Thus, rational choice theory makes predictable and universal assump-
tions (such as on instrumentality, consequentialism and self-interest) on the
underlying motivations for human action – an attempt similar in intent to
the replication of a typical “laboratory” specimen, but in this case, of hu-
man behaviour, that ﬁts readily into the universal scientiﬁc epistemology. The
resultant eﬀect is the reductionist, straight-jacketing of social phenomena in
ways that ignore or treat as redundant, vast areas of social phenomena that do
not easily lend to conscription in such ways that mimic the positivist science
of physics. But as von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) well noted “it is
unlikely that a mere repetition of the tricks that served us well in physics will
do for the social phenomena too.” An obvious reason is the diﬀerences in the
objects of enquiry: while physics deals with magnitudes of spatio-temporal
matter, the objects of enquiry in the social sciences are multi-dimensional.
Therefore, because the object of inquiry is not just about inanimate matter as
in the physical sciences, but about human beings that are as rational as they
are emotional and spiritual, the application of the scientiﬁc epistemology in
the social sciences encounters many pitfalls.
4 Limits of Social Scientism
Social scientism is the outcome of the overriding ambition to apply the highly
successful scientiﬁc epistemology founded on rational choice to social reality.
Although construed by its proponents to be ahistorical, non-particularistic
and universal, history suggests that it was a contextually determined mo-
ment, as well as a historically, speciﬁc response to a unique set of problems
– a response to the ’social question’– emerging in the aftermath of the In-
dustrial Revolution, answers to which, scholars of the period felt, could only
be provided by imitating the natural science ideal couched in scienticism. The
emergence of the social sciences coincides with that of the features of the mod-
ern society in the eighteenth-century – increasing social sophistication and its
attendant anomalies occasioned by increasing industrialization, urbanization,
rise of commercial capitalism, the birth of competing ﬁrms, colonial conquest
of nations in search of industrial raw materials and new markets, etc. Faced
with the challenges of the new features of modernity, scholars became increas-
ingly disenchanted with the old historical method which, many felt unable
12to interpret, let alone, predict. The scientiﬁc method of the natural sciences
in its capacity for evidence-based analysis, control and prediction presented
itself as a compelling alternative to the inane historical method (Ross, 1991;
Bernard and Bernard, 1933; Beck, 1949). For many scholars, the only route
open to progress in social research is the adoption of the natural science ideal
of the scientiﬁc method. Yet, this choice was at the same time, vigorously
challenged by some others who felt that scienticism was not an ideal for the
understanding of man and his society. Among the earliest critiques of social
scientism include works by Knight (1924), Hayek (1942, 1943,1944), and Beck
(1949).
Despite the criticisms, majority of scholars were strongly convinced that the
scientiﬁc method was capable of providing knowledge of the underlying prin-
ciples of social change, providing falsiﬁable rules of action and operation, and
ﬁnding regularities as a basis for control and prediction of social phenomena.
That this method was mechanistic and deals with external, material, objects
rather than human subjects was not of immediate concern. In the twentieth
century, the mechanistic vision of the universe fashioned in the natural sci-
ences was imported wholesale into the study of human society. Most of the
early twentieth-century sociologists and neoclassical economists like Walras,
Marshall, Pareto, and Fisher all had appreciable understanding of classical
nineteenth-century physics, and set as their major task, the application of
this same mechanistic and mathematical approach to social theory in general
and economics in particular (Ganley, 1995; Lieberson and Lynn, 2002). For
example, in his Economics and Mechanics, Walras traced the origins of his
general equilibrium theory to nineteenth century theoretical physics (Walras,
1990).
By analogy, the social and anthropological universe compares to the natural
universe such that certain rules and principles apply similarly to both (Hayek,
1943). However, signiﬁcant diﬀerences are still obvious. Whereas the physicist
can easily subject physical objects to experimentation to validate a hypothe-
sis or ´ apriori guess, the social scientist faces severe obstacles in subjecting the
social system to similar experimentation. Albeit, statistics and econometrics
have developed many powerful and eﬃcient standards for dealing with social
data. Yet, the unavailability of genuine, “scientiﬁc experimentation” severely
limits the applicability of the scientiﬁc method in the strict sense. Construc-
tion of speciﬁc concept of rigor and parsimony in social research only slightly
mitigates this problem.
The application of the scientiﬁc epistemology in the pure and applied, posi-
tivist sciences is straight forward, because they deal speciﬁcally with matter
that is quantiﬁable, representable by proxies, and could be observed and cal-
ibrated within a laboratory set-up. In this case, laboratory experiments are
used to establish causal relationship among network of interacting objects.
13Also, the subject-object distinction is readily apparent. In social science ﬁelds
where the object is not readily available for laboratory experimentation, re-
curse is made to proxy representation of the object in a manner that renders
it quantiﬁable and therefore, calculable. Once done, the object is subjected to
pseudo-experimentation within a pseudo-laboratory context.
In the social sciences too, it has a direct application when the object possesses
tangible elements. But in some instances, the object of inquiry may not be
an object datum such as a stone, a tree, the ﬂow of the river, the ﬂow of
income, the stock of oil or interest rate. Even if it is, may not easily submit to
objectiﬁcation. Moreover, the subject-object distinction is blurred such that
instead of a subject-object relationship, there comes to be a dynamic relation-
ship characterized by inter-subjectivity and interdependence. The otherness
– cognitive separability assumption – of the object of research , which is a
cardinal principle of the scientiﬁc method, no longer holds true thus leading
to the break down of Adam Smith’s notion of “impartial spectator” (Hayek,
1944).
The perceived limitations in applying the methods of science in the social
sciences have constituted one of the deﬁning moments of twentieth century
debate in the philosophy of the social sciences (Mirowski, 1988; von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1944). In addition to providing a mechanistic interpretation
of natural phenomena, the scientiﬁc world view seems to have entrenched a
dualistic conception of reality which extols its utilitarian dimensions (Anya,
1993; Bronowski and Mazlish, 1970). Despite its achievements, critics argue
that it accounts for a limited scope of reality – just the quantiﬁable aspects of
things. Its emphasis on measurement and quantiﬁcation implies a one-sided
focus on the material and physical world, and a treatment of everything as
if quantity. It does not account for the full nature of human beings as not
only material or bodily entities, but also beings endowed with the mental
and spiritual capabilities to project beyond the observable spatio-temporal
dimensions of reality. Within the scientiﬁc realm, reality is relevant to the
extent that it can be subjected to quantiﬁcation and measurement. This has in
turn, produced a mode of thinking that is not as interested in what the object
is as in whether it is quantiﬁable or measurable and thereby conditioning a
manner of thinking that looks just to see measurable and quantiﬁable things.
Strict application of this world view has no place for things that defy “ratio-
nal” explanations. The fact was missed that even scientists show subjective
preference not only in matters of extra-scientiﬁc judgement, but even in their
scientiﬁc work. While deduction and induction are valid methodologies in sci-
ence, a well developed scientiﬁc imagination and even faith have been part
of the conditioning environment in which the break-throughs of science took
place (Medawar, 1969).
144.1 Conclusion: Alternatives to Rational Choice and Scientiﬁc Method?
The nature of the subject matter of the core natural and physical sciences
–matter– makes it be that the scientiﬁc method has, as yet, no viable alterna-
tive. In both orientation and formulation, it is suited to the nature of material
objects which most of the sciences deal with. In many cases, the reliability of
the its instruments determine the level of validity of scientiﬁc research. But
because, at the end, the true value or signiﬁcance of scientiﬁc research is a
matter of subjective judgment (Medawar, 1969), scientiﬁc method must rely
on statistics. Recent research has shown that statistics are not fool-proof and
sometimes, the interpretation of the results of scientiﬁc research are erroneous
(The Economist, 2005). However, this occurs in scientiﬁc disciplines where
subjective judgement is required to reach conclusions on implementation such
as drugs research, clinical testing, epidemiology, etc.
But for social scientism and its dependence on subjective rationality, various
recent experimental researches have shown that strict rationality, as assumed
in the social sciences, does not reﬂect the true nature of human beings (Zak,
2005). In the past, various studies including Fine (2001), Elster (2000)and
Boudon (2003) have detailed diﬀerent types of social phenomena that defy
the explanatory power of the rational choice theory, prominent among them
are social actions that spring from belief. As a result, modiﬁcations such as
assumptions of “bounded rationality”, game theory formulations under as-
sumptions of asymmetric information, and interaction models (Durlauf and
Young, 2001) are gradually being used by researchers to study aggregate be-
haviors of people. But these attempts still make heavy reliance on the meth-
ods of mathematical sciences and physics, which create hypothetical models
for which the prospects of suitable empirical data is at moment, a daunting
task. Especially, we witness a resurgence of the early attempt by neoclassical
economists to import the methods of physics into economics that has already
engendered a new ﬁeld termed “econophysics” (Farmer et al., 2005).
At the same time too, we witness rapid progress in ever expanding horizons
which seem to be advancing the rational choice project such as in “economics
of religion” and “Accounting for Taste” (Becker, 1996; Lawson, 2004), as a
way to counter the deﬁciencies of social scientism. The end result is that at
moment, there seems to be no viable alternative to either the scientiﬁc method
or the rational choice theory version of social scientism.
In conclusion, we note that the scientiﬁc epistemology, with its focus on what
is quantiﬁable, measurable and describable, has the great merit of delivering
manageable knowledge; knowledge that works as in the positivist sciences. It is
result oriented, and produces practical beneﬁts in technological advancement.
In the policy-oriented social sciences, it helps in the evolution of implementable
15policies which, may not be possible otherwise. In spite of these perceived
advantages and merits of the scientiﬁc epistemology, it shares with other modes
of knowledge such as arts, the orientation towards the true, the good and
the beautiful - which are the universal objects of knowledge. Science strives
towards unveiling the true universal laws of nature, and channeling these laws
to ends that serve the good of people. In the same way, the arts employ physical
mediums to express and represent both the observable physical phenomena
and the unobservable internal dimensions of the human reality.
In the arts, such as sculpture, music, or poetry, the artists strive to capture
ﬂeeting events of life in objective media. Michelangelo’s sculptor of David and
Einstein’s theory of relativity may be worlds apart, but both share in the
context of being expressions of deeper truths. David projects the true gait of
man at a point in time between thinking and action that precedes victory.
Einstein on the other hand, discovered the universal laws that underlie the
spatio-temporal continuum. Both of these are expressions of objective reality
albeit reached via diﬀerent routes. In other words, the scientiﬁc epistemology
is just another way of knowing reality alongside arts. Therefore, in the social
sciences, especially, when the interobjectivity or intersubjectivity of both the
object and subject of research are inseparable, it may be more illuminating
to allow the nature of what is investigated to determine the appropriate way
in which it should be known rather than approaching it already armed with a
pre-deﬁned methodology.
Notes
1Descartes’ thinking subject can be interpreted as the Enlightenment re-statement
of Protagoras’ man-measure principle. Protagoras (485 BC - 421 BC) held that “man
is the measure of all things”
2The concept of faith before understanding ﬁdes quaerens intellectum
3Kant refers to these as the transcendental “` a priori” preconditions that empow-
ers the subject to receive the object (Kant, 1995)
4Observation involves conscious (or rational) activity on the part of the subject
to appraise or understand an object of attention. Even in case of reﬂexive con-
sciousness, i.e. consciousness turning back on itself, one consciousness, the observer,
stands as the investigating, knowing subject relative to the other which becomes
the object that is investigated.
5The world picture according to Heidegger (1977a).
166Kant built his transcendental idealism on the three question: What do we know?
How do we know? What do we do? and What do we hope for?
7Completeness, Reﬂexivity and Transitivity
8A is A, A is not-A, Everything is either A or not-A
9Every magnitude is equal to itself, the part is less than the whole, and two
magnitudes, equal separately to a third, are equal to each other, etc.
10That a thing is(Principle of Identity), that a thing cannot be and not be at the
same time (Principle of Diﬀerence)
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